Serendipity – The Steroids of Venture Capital
I’m a sucker for analogies between sports and business. With Barry Bonds on the cusp of tying Hank Aaron’s homerun record, the issue of steroid usage is front and center in sports. That got me thinking about “performance enhancement” in the venture capital business. In other words, how do you transition from “safer” investment strategies to ones that provide more upside?
But what about the venture investment business? Can someone make the switch from one investment style to another? It’s a relevant question to ask because today’s investment climate for web ventures provides strong incentives to be the venture equivalent of a doubles-hitter.
Before we consider the question, it’s important to review general parallels between styles of venture investing and hitting a baseball.
In baseball, there’s no single way to be productive as a hitter. A player will settle into an approach that meets his skills and capabilities. The same holds true for disbursing investment capital. A high probability of singles and doubles can be equally rewarding as a more infrequent number of homeruns (IRR doesn’t discriminate). Like other investment disciplines, the venture business is about developing perspectives on risk and rewards. If you’ve ever pitched a venture investor, you can often see how their questions and evaluation of your company are focused on isolating elements of risk and reward. Risk is typically partitioned into buckets – team risk, technology risk, product risk, market risk, etc – whereas reward is thought about in terms of levels of success (how big can this company be in a high, medium or low case). There’s a lot of ways to play this matrixed analysis, but one simple way to bucket the venture community (recognizing there’s gray area) is to think about Risk-minimizers and Reward-maximizers. Every venture capitalist mixes both outlooks, but there can only be one style that predominates. That’s the issue we’re concerned with here.
Risk-minimizers have a lower bound for possible upside. That’s a very pragmatic strategy which offers a lot of protection and is a good reflection of the law of averages. For a web business today, this might be an exit valuation in the $20mm-$30mm range. Like any investor, Risk-minimizers would love to see their portfolio companies exit in the hundreds of millions, but they’re not depending on it. After qualifying companies for this upside filter, Risk-minimizers turn their attention to their specialty. Here they start to size up the risk factors. The more risk factors, the less likely they will be to invest. The extent of the risk surrounding any given factor is an equally important set of considerations, though risk-minimizers may pay less attention to that dimension than the absolute number of risks. Let’s consider some straightforward examples. Team-risk can stem from a lacking someone to fill a key role (CTO or VP/Marketing) depending on the nature of the business. A higher bar for team risk can involve not only the fit of a particular person in terms of credentials (CTO of a search company having a higher level degree in a related field) but also a specific track-record (say a leadership role in commercializing a successful product). Technology risk speaks to basic feasibility. Is something even possible to do within acceptable parameters for scalability, performance, relevance, response-time, etc? Product risk, on the web, has mostly to do with whether a cohesive user experience can be conceived and delivered using the underlying technology. Finally, market risk is exactly what it sounds like. Will they come and will they care?
By contrast, there are investment opportunities on the web with more fundamental risk profiles. That does not make these types of investments better or worse at face value. These risks can include basic technical feasibility or the need for clarity on application focus. But these risks can be managed to some degree by isolating the critical design issues and strategies (in case of technical hurdles) or possible use cases (in the case of application-direction). With today’s rapid customer feedback loops and iterative development cycles, the ability to try several options quickly is also compressing that risk. Provided there’s a multiplier on the potential upside, the risk/reward ratio might tilt very favorably towards these types of investments when something truly unique and valuable comes to the table. Reward-maximizers play here. The best ones, undoubtedly, are able to arbitrage perceived risk from actual risk.
Viewed from this lense, today’s idea flow from web start-ups constitutes a field day for Risk-minimizers. Most web ideas are focused on enabling new user experiences that don’t rely on major technology risks. The initial products can be developed for a few hundred thousand dollars. A passionate entrepreneur who seizes the opportunity first is equally as backable today as someone with a certain pedigree. That leaves market risk as the main ingredient to evaluate. Since products development costs are so manageable, some degree of market risk is usually alleviated before companies approach venture backers. Most web companies have some degree of customer traction before they take their first dollar of venture capital (not necessarily invested capital). That creates huge incentives to wait for investment opportunities which sort of speak for themselves because everything seems to be in place. This is the major force driving venture investment on the web today and sometimes clouds the possibility of investments with bigger upside possibilities. We’re living the venture equivalent of the inverted yield curve (for you former bankers, you know what I mean).
So what are the implications of today’s venture dynamics? Here where the sports parallels reach limitations. In baseball, it’s unlikely for a hitter in his prime to transition from one style to another. While it’s challenging in the venture business to do the same, it’s certainly not unheard of. The challenge stems from becoming proficient at investing with a certain success formula. The outlook and capabilities of a venture professional will be formed around successes. So when it comes to pattern recognition for new investments, those filters will be tuned specifically for what’s worked in the past. Based on the today’s funding tendencies, these are risk-minimized investments that have decent upside.
But venture investing is a knowledge business and it’s possible to tailor investment strategies for different phases of the technology industry. The mind is more versatile than physical mechanics (despite the link). Also, a break out investment made under the assumption of risk-minimizing can be the perfect way to learn the reward-maximizing kind of business. There are no steroids in the venture business that will turn a consistent doubles-hitter into a bonafide slugger, but serendipity is a better substitute. It’s the risk-adjusted way to learn how to spot the exceptions which make for homerun investments.
It’s important for an entrepreneur to align their start-ups with the investment approach of the venture professional. While there are venture folks who knows how to play things both ways, that’s the exception rather than the rule. If you have a company that offers an above-average risk profile (albeit compensated by a multiplier on reward), then you’re better off targeting investors who know how to make those investments. This will probably be a better use of time for both sides.
There’s no one way to make money in the start-up business as investor or entrepreneur. It’s good to match the know-how of a venture professional with the business opportunity being pursued by the entrepreneur.
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Tags: Barry Bonds, Web 2 0 Investments, Steroids, IRR, Risk and Reward, Inverted Yield Curve,

Very interesting comments. Interesting website. Have sampled some of the blog entries and enjoyed reading 'em. Too bad there isn't much dialog here. The topics you're raising certainly deserve some back-'n-forth.
Very interesting treatment here about sports statistics and its application in the VC world. But you don't factor some major events that have shaped the innovation in the past couple of years.
With the advent of web 2.0, the playing field has never been as levelled (or open) as it is now. With no company having an overwhelming advantage in this area, we're seeing another wave of the phenomenon we saw in late 90's, when the focus was on how many eyes you are able to attract to your website. True, we're all looking for more tangibles (viable business model, financial model, realistic goals, etc); still, even those without such models are able to hit homeruns. Think Youtube, MySpace. What do they do? They bring people to the site and get them to stay. Fair and simple. And when there's a connection, it certainly leaves behind all "inverted yield curves"!!
Another recent event has been the increase in broadband deployment, not just nationally but worldwide, that has suddenly open doors previously considered impenetrable. YouTube would not have existed in 1999.
That said, your points are valid; this is certainly not to challenge them but to throw some more spice into the pot. Thanks for the stimulation!
Nadeem Moghal
Thanks for sharing your thoughts and continuing the dialogue. I did expect folks to raise examples like YouTube and MySpace, though those examples may actually turn out to be good demonstrations of serendipity as an investment strategy.
The issue has not to do with outcomes of venture investments, whether they be homeruns or something else. It’s the assumptions that underlie these investments at the time of investment. Specifically, what was the investment thesis in terms of risk and reward. That needs to be compared to the actual outcome to generate insight into how to approach the current start-up climate.
When we look at successful investment outcomes, we need to rewind to initial assumptions.
Were these investments expected to be doubles that fortunately turned into homeruns? Or maybe the potential scale of success was understood at the time of investment while also factoring in big risk profiles? Or, in a third scenario, maybe these were nirvana deals where perceived risk was low but potential outcomes were very high.
The last scenario is the “inverted yield curve” scenario which you picked-up on. Since these deals are the most obvious to spot (traffic speaks for itself), they also attract the most attention. In today’s auction-driven fundraising environment, prices for such deals are going to rise (non-linearly based on how obvious the traction may be). This will influence the returns – making the “curve” more normalized over time. While we may remain out of equilibrium for some time, it’s a lucky venture capitalist who can bank on repeatably landing such deals. These scenarios will become considerably less likely though not impossible sources of dealflow. The second scenario is pretty rare too – it’s hard to predict the future. I’m guessing the first situation was more representative, though the people who did these deals would have to speak to it.
Net, net: there will be outcomes like YouTube and MySpace. But to get insight into the matter, we need to compare the inputs to the outputs. Outputs alone don’t reveal much.
Thanks again for helping extend the dialogue – you’re thoughts are very relevant!